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Last week the IMF published a review of the financial assistance given to Greece during its debt crisis.
One of the key limitations identified in the report was that debt relief for the country was provided far
later than it should have been. Waltraud Schelkle writes on the fallout from the report, which
generated angry responses from both the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
She argues that while the second Greek rescue programme was undoubtedly late, it was also
insufficient: amounting to a write-down of only around 33 per cent of Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio. As
a result Greece is likely to need a third rescue programme.
In its recent evaluation report of the first Greek programme, the IMF conceded that debt relief for
Greece came too late. The IMF formulated the report largely as self-criticism, but the other two members of the
troika, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), were not amused. The ECB rejected the
critique with the calm air of the untouchable while the Commission, senior partner in the Greek rescue programme,
reacted quite angrily. How bad are the tensions in the troika?
Far from revealing a deep rift within the troika, the IMF report shows a fundamental consensus among the three
partners. The IMF said it was wrong the first time round, but would do the same again if confronted with a similar
situation of uncertainty now. So does the criticism boil down to the notion that the second rescue programme should
have come with less delay once the overly-optimistic assumptions became obvious? If so, the Commission would be
angry for good reason: if the right thing has been done now, everybody should just shut up and let the Greek
government get on with the job. After all, the EU is a union of democracies and this has to be respected.
But has the second Greek programme done the right
thing? There is a crucial paragraph in the IMF report
that sums up what went wrong: ‘Earlier debt
restructuring could have eased the burden of
adjustment on Greece and contributed to a less
dramatic contraction in output. The delay provided a
window for private creditors to reduce exposures and
shift debt into official hands. This shift occurred on a
significant scale and left the official sector on the hook.’
(p. 33) In joint research with Deborah Mabbett, I have
attempted to understand why the debt dynamic under
the first programme was so dramatic. The official
explanation for why there must not be an early default is
moral hazard: once governments know they can get an
easy bailout from other member states, they get
themselves into such situations again. (Our conclusion
is that the primary explanation is that Germany is
concerned with limiting its exposure, rather than
addressing the problem of moral hazard – but this is
beyond this blog.)
Under the first programme (2010-2011), the debt-to-
GDP ratio ballooned by more than 40 per cent. Yet, the
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primary budget deficit contributed only 7 per cent to this
40 per cent rise. This was due to a dramatic turnaround
in the fiscal situation: the IMF report notes that the
‘ambitious’ (read: harsh) conditionality on fiscal
adjustment was pretty much the only thing that was
slightly over-fulfilled by the Greek authorities at the time.
The explosion of the debt ratio was the result of a
collapsing economy, ie the denominator of the ratio
declined, and high real interest rates since prices and
wages dropped significantly. The second rescue
programme then conceded for the first time that
sovereign debt had to be written down. By March 2012,
private bondholders were cajoled into accepting
haircuts that would bring down the Greek debt ratio to a
sustainable level.
But contrary to the impression that the widely published
figure of a ’70 per cent haircut’ created, the Greek
government got much less debt relief. This was
because the major private bondholders that had to write
down their claims against the Greek government were
Greek banks. But since the Greek banks became
insolvent when they had to write down their holdings by
such a high percentage, they had to be recapitalised.
They were recapitalised out of the funds the government
received under the second programme. So while the
public debt that Greek banks held was written down,
some of it came back on the Greek government’s books
as debt to the EU and the IMF, with which the
government had acquired shares in ailing domestic banks. There were also quite a few ‘PSI sweeteners’ built into
the programme (the term is official IMF language), which are concessions to the private bondholders to make them
agree to a write-down of the face value of their bonds. The sweeteners and bank recapitalisation reduced the
effective debt write-down by more than half. All in all, the IMF estimated the net reduction of the debt ratio from
Public Sector Involvement (PSI) in the order of 33 per cent, so less than what the debt dynamic under the first
programme had added.
One could call this a merry-go-round if only it were merry. From the point of view of the Greek government, the
second programme amounted largely to a swap of creditors, not to debt relief: the IMF and the European emergency
fund replaced domestic banks. Greece will need a third programme because the second was not merely late, but
also insufficient: the effective debt write-down was a rather smallish 33 per cent of Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio and
largely borne by Greek bondholders. The rescue programme will have to live up to its name and not be a merely
symbolic gesture that gives a completely distorted image of the Greek adjustment effort, the amount of debt relief
granted and the distribution of the losses.
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